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Abstract: This article examines the 
little-known Allied effort to provide 
for the needs of the Sicilian civilian 
population during Operation Husky. 
Allied Military Government (AMG) 
was created in January 1943 to 
support the strategic aim of knocking 
Italy out of the war by creating 
and maintaining a benevolent 
atmosphere on the island. The duty 
of civil affairs officers was to relieve 
the fighting troops from the challenge 
of delivering humanitarian aid or 
dealing with a hostile population.  
Despite some mishaps and missteps 
on the part of planners, civil affairs 
made a significant contribution to the 
success of Operation Husky. 
In the 70 years since Allied soldiers landed on the island of Sicily 
many accounts have been published 
about the genesis and conduct of the 
campaign. Few, however, consider 
the effect the intense military 
operations had on the Sicilian 
people and the measures taken by 
the Allies to reduce the impact on 
civilians. In fact, the few references to 
Allied Military Government (AMG) 
highlight the role the Allies played 
in re-introducing known mafiosi 
back into the Sicilian social and 
political landscape after Mussolini 
was reportedly successful in his 
campaign to rid the country of the 
crime organization.2 It is true that civil 
affairs officers were forced, due to a 
lack of resources, to rely on existing, 
anti-Fascist administrators which 
opened the door for certain unsavory 
individuals to seize opportunities 
and positions of power. The scenario 
emerged out of necessity, however, 
and should not discount the impact 
AMG had on the health and welfare 
of the civilian population during 
and after the Sicilian campaign. 
The elaborate AMG administrative 
structure was designed to facilitate 
Allied operations on the island by 
relieving fighting troops from the 
problem of delivering humanitarian 
aid or dealing with a possibly hostile 
population. These measures, despite 
mishaps and some underestimations, 
made a significant contribution to 
the success of Operation Husky. For 
the longer term, AMG allowed for 
the rehabilitation of the apparatus of 
the Sicilian government, and other 
infrastructure essential to deliver the 
basic necessities of day to day life; 
these underpinnings of civil society 
had been degraded by decades of 
Fascist mismanagement even before 
the severe damage resulting from the 
military operations. 
Unprecedented in scope and its 
multi-national nature,3 AMG was 
a complex organization intended 
to restore peace and stability to a 
population ravaged by war and 
twenty years of Fascism. The cost of 
the planning and execution of Allied 
Military Government in Sicily was 
significant, drawing on the already 
limited resources available for the 
secondary effort in the Mediterranean. 
It was also a dangerous assignment 
for the civil affairs officers who often 
worked close to the front lines. In 
the end, the effort devoted to AMG 
paid off. Although Allied Armies 
were entering enemy territory, the 
population accepted Allied soldiers as 
liberators. This was fortunate for civil 
affairs officers as the implementation 
of military government in Sicily was 
a trial run for the organization that 
would soon have to be developed in 
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 
Many lessons learned in Sicily were 
integrated into plans for future 
operations. 
This article looks at the planning, 
application, and then briefly considers 
the follow on operations and lessons 
learned from the Sicily operation. 
Allied Military Government in 
Sicily was predominantly staffed 
“To bury the dead and 
to feed the living”
Allied Military Government in Sicily, 1943
Cindy Brown
“It was also obvious, to the early planners, that many strategic and tactical events and conditions could not possibly 
be anticipated – a situation which made all phases of CA/MG more difficult to estimate, operate and maintain.”1
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by American and British soldiers. 
Although the Canadian Army 
only played an ad hoc role in the 
military governance of Sicily, the 
function carried out by civil affairs 
officers was still required in their 
area of operations, as the article will 
demonstrate. In the absence of civil 
affairs contingents in the Canadian 
sector, Canadian regiments were 
required to fulfill the role.
The plan for Allied Military 
Government of Sicily was born 
at the Casablanca conference in 
mid-January when the decision 
was made to return to German-
occupied Europe via the Italian 
island, leaving less than six months 
to define the organization and recruit 
and train personnel. The objective 
for the military governance of Sicily 
was first and foremost to relieve 
combat troops from “the necessity of 
providing for civil administration.” 
The second objective was “to restore 
law and order and normal conditions 
among the civil population as soon as 
possible.”4 All of this was in support 
of the overall Allied goal of knocking 
Italy out of the war. There were a 
number of indications that the Italian 
people were tiring of the Fascist-led 
war and Allied planners believed that 
the population would be “responsive 
to a just, efficient, and disinterested 
administration.” Planners thought 
that the best course of action was to 
inform Sicilians that the Allied attack 
was intended to deliver them from 
the Fascist regime and “to restore 
Italy as a free nation.”5 In spite 
of intelligence that indicated that 
Italians were tired of war, planners 
could not be certain that Allied 
force, seven reinforced divisions and 
elements of two airborne divisions, 
would be welcomed as liberators by 
the Sicilians. The German presence 
throughout Italy meant the German 
army could seize control of factories 
and workers and disarm soldiers at 
the first sign of an Allied invasion.6 
This fact weighed heavily on the 
minds of Allied planners who 
understood that the threat posed by 
the well-placed and strong German 
forces could deter Italian cooperation. 
Much of the planning for AMG was 
based on the best available evidence 
and a great number of assumptions 
about what a campaign on the island 
of Sicily might bring.
Despite the uncertainty about the 
Sicilian reaction, the Allies planned 
for the best case scenario. Although 
the debate at Casablanca wavered 
Officers of the London Metropolitan Police were recruited to mentor the Italian Carabinieri in occupied Sicily. 
Italian Carabinieri worked with civil affairs officers to maintain peace in the towns and villages of Sicily.
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between the choices of direct or 
indirect Allied control in Sicily, the 
lack of personnel necessitated plans 
for a system of indirect control. Under 
this system, civil affairs officers 
were appointed to oversee and 
advise on the administration of large 
territories. Civil affairs officers were 
responsible for determining if existing 
administrators, including mayors, 
prefects, and even teachers, were 
suitable to remain in their posts. It 
was expected that the majority of the 
existing Italian administration would 
remain intact. When possible, willing 
anti-fascists would be appointed to 
positions of authority in the provincial 
administration.7 The decision to 
implement indirect rule still had a 
heavy personnel requirement: the 
operation required 400 civil affairs 
officers, approximately one for every 
10,000 Sicilians.8 Many of these civil 
affairs officers had little to no prior 
experience in military government or 
with the military in general. 
The planned structure for military 
governance in Sicily included six 
administrative divisions. These 
divisions, legal, finance, civilian 
supply, public health, public safety, 
and enemy property, accounted for 
all facets of civilian life. Providing the 
expertise for this diverse organization 
was no small feat. Once the decision 
was made to invade Sicily, the 
Allies had less than six months to 
recruit and train enough civil affairs 
officers to staff AMG. From the 
outset, AMG was a fully integrated 
multinational Allied effort9 which 
allowed for both the British and the 
Americans to draw on their own 
experience and expertise.10 The 
British had a number of personnel 
who had prior military government 
experience in North Africa while 
the Americans recruited a number 
of their civil affairs officers from the 
large Italian-American population, 
many of whom still had connections 
to Italy. Italian-Americans of recent 
origin had language skills and 
knowledge of Italian culture which 
proved infinitely valuable.11 In June 
and July 1943 approximately 300 
soldiers participated in training 
programs but the learning curve 
was steep as very few had prior 
military experience. Two-week civil 
affairs courses were held in North 
Africa to provide personnel with 
instruction in the Italian language, 
a basic understanding of military 
government with particular emphasis 
on the situation in Sicily and Italy, 
specific knowledge related to the 
divisions of expertise, and physical 
training.12 The two-week training 
program was designed to  be 
comprehensive, but such a short 
course could hardly prepare these 
Sicilian children.
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civil affairs officers to enter hostile 
territory and assume control of civil 
administration. 
The structure created for military 
governance in Sicily was based on 
detailed assessments, including but 
not limited to how much food should 
be available from local agriculture in 
the summer period, what proportion 
of the Italian administration could 
be continued, and, as we have seen, 
estimates about how well Allied 
troops and military government 
might be received. The reality of the 
situation proved much different from 
the projections in important instances. 
On the ground, the structure of the 
six divisions and their operations 
evolved on the basis of practical day 
to day experience. To understand 
how events unfolded it is useful to 
look at the specific responsibilities 
of the six administrative divisions. 
The breadth of these responsibilities 
shows that Allied planners intended 
to provide comprehensive support 
aimed to restore Italy to its pre-fascist 
state. 
The legal division was responsible 
for ensuring commanders worked 
within the limits of international law 
including the Hague Conventions 
during the administration of military 
government. In addition, CAOs of the 
legal division issued proclamations 
declaring the authority of military 
government and describing how it 
worked; they created military courts 
to try war crimes and ensured existing 
civilian courts functioned properly.13 
The finance division administered 
all matters relating to currency and 
exchange. As a temporary emergency 
measure, the first task of the Finance 
Civil Affairs Officer upon entering a 
town or city was to close the banks 
to prevent mass withdrawals which 
could lead to financial collapse. Once 
the situation was deemed stable, the 
Italian banks were to be permitted 
to re-open, under appropriate Allied 
supervision. The finance division 
also instituted an Allied currency 
for procuring supplies which, in 
the event, had the effect of causing 
rampant inflation both on Sicily and 
the mainland.14 
One of the main tasks of AMG 
was to ensure that the occupied 
populations would remain peaceful 
and orderly. This was partly achieved 
by the legal and finance divisions 
which mitigated the risk of chaos 
by ensuring the legal components 
of civil life continued and by the 
temporary closure of banks. The 
public safety division, responsible for 
civil police matters, provided the final 
deterrent to crime and chaos. The 
lack of personnel, however, meant 
that AMG personnel were forced to 
rely on the existing national police 
force, the Carabinieri, technically 
part of the Italian Armed forces but 
traditionally loyal to the monarchy 
and not the Fascist head of state.15 
To solve this problem, AMG formed 
a special detachment of the London 
Metropolitan Police designated as 
Civil Affairs Police Officers (CAPOs) 
who acted as mentors and liaisons 
with the Carabinieri, a role which 
foreshadowed the recent use of Police 
Operational Mentor and Liaison 
Teams (POMLTs) in Afghanistan.16 
In the course of operations, the work 
of the London Metropolitan Police in 
their mentoring role had the added 
effect of restoring faith in the national 
police force.17
The public health and civilian 
supply divisions were both concerned 
with the health and welfare of the 
Italian population. The timing of 
the Sicily operation, planned for the 
height of summer, had its advantages 
and disadvantages. Casualties were 
expected from Allied bombing 
operations throughout the spring 
and summer of 1943 and the dead 
trapped beneath crumbled buildings 
threatened the health of the survivors 
in the hot and humid Sicilian summer 
sun. Public health was responsible for 
ensuring those bodies were recovered 
and properly buried to prevent 
widespread disease. In addition, 
public health was responsible for all 
issues associated with the welfare 
of civilians, including mass relief, 
disease prevention (including 
venereal disease) and ensuring 
civilian hospitals were assessed and, 
when possible, opened and staffed by 
Italian doctors and nurses. Feeding 
the population and providing other 
necessary commodities was the 
role of the civilian supply division. 
Intelligence indicated that Sicily 
The lack of personnel and resources 
meant that civil affairs officers had to 
rely on the labour of local civilians to 
repair battle damage in villages.
Ca
na
di
an
 W
ar
 M
us
eu
m
 1
98
90
22
3-
11
7
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss3/3
39
was self-sufficient in wheat and the 
landings would happen around the 
harvest time. In spite of this, the 
civilian supply division was expected 
to organize a 90-day emergency store 
and to control rationing.18 As will be 
seen, even these essential tasks were 
hindered by the shortage of resources 
and organizational issues.
The f inal  divis ion,  enemy 
property,  at  f irst  sight seems 
somewhat outside the scope of 
AMG. It would prove, especially 
as the campaign in Italy progressed 
to the mainland and the Italian 
nation became co-belligerents in the 
fight, very important in maintaining 
good relations with the Italian 
populace. The main task of enemy 
property was to restore goods to 
the rightful owners. In addition, 
the division was responsible for the 
protection and conservation of Italian 
property. Within the enemy property 
division was an educational advisor, 
responsible for assessing local schools 
and curriculum and an advisor on 
fine arts and monuments. The latter 
was given the task of assessing and 
protecting sites, monuments, and 
archives of cultural, religious, and 
historical importance as far as it 
was militarily feasible. The Allies 
intended to distinguish themselves 
from the Germans through their 
efforts to protect Italy’s historical and 
cultural treasures.
Limited resources and personnel, 
minimum training, and the diverse 
responsibilities of the six divisions 
meant that the use of existing Italian 
institutions became an important 
solution for the successful operation 
of Allied Military Government in 
Sicily. Although initially a pragmatic 
decision due to lack of resources 
and personnel, the use of existing 
Italian institutions had the effect 
of rehabilitating the civic nature 
of Italian society and restoring the 
faith of the people in an Italian-
run administration. Moreover, the 
nature of the divisions and their 
assigned tasks proved the Allies 
intended to treat the Italians in 
a benevolent manner despite the 
fact that the Italian nation was 
both Fascist and enemy in July 
1943.19 From the outset, the plan 
was to encourage the Sicilians 
and Italians to cooperate by 
insisting that Mussolini was 
the enemy, not the Italian 
people. The assaulting troops 
carried with them a message 
from General Eisenhower that 
stated that Allied troops were 
occupying Italian territory, 
not as enemies of the Italian 
people, but to overturn the 
German and Italian tyranny, 
and restore the traditional laws 
and traditions of the Italian 
people.20 A further message 
from President Roosevelt and 
Prime Minister Churchill was 
drafted to be broadcast to the 
Italian people after the Allies 
had gained a foothold on the 
island and could be reasonably 
sure of the success of the mission. 
Roosevelt and Churchill placed 
the onus on the Italian people:
The time has now come for you, 
the Italian people to consult your 
own self-respect and your own 
interests and your own desire for 
a restoration of national dignity, 
security and peace. The time has 
come for you to decide whether 
Italians shall die for Mussolini and 
Hitler – or live for Italy and for 
civilization.21
 Fortunately, the gamble paid off 
and the Sicilian population regarded 
the Allies as liberators. The troops and 
civil affairs officers were welcomed 
for the most part with enthusiasm 
and, in some cases, wine.22 The 
critical lack of resources, Allied 
bombardments, and the inexperience 
of many of the civil affairs officers 
could have led to disaster had the 
population not been so receptive. 
One of the most important lessons 
learned in the first few days was the 
requirement for civil affairs officers 
to advance with the fighting troops. 
As the fighting troops penetrated into 
the island they encountered Sicilian 
populations who were sometimes, 
but not always, enthusiastic and 
receptive but at other times a threat 
to the advance. Civil affairs officers 
were hindered from the beginning 
because of the lack of integration 
with the fighting forces. In the initial 
landings on 10 July 1943, only a 
minimal number of AMG personnel 
were permitted to land on the 
beaches with the first waves of 
assault troops.23 These CAOs were 
expected to assess the local situation 
Allied trucks deliver flour to the 
main piazza in Catania, Sicily.
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and begin the process of forming 
the provincial administration in the 
area of occupation.24 These CAOs 
were often left with few resources 
to accomplish their task. Lieutenant-
Colonel Gerald Wellesley, the Duke of 
Wellington, was part of the first wave 
of civil affairs officers that landed 
with the assault forces on D-Day. 
Wellesley and his fellow civil affairs 
officers came ashore about ten miles 
south of Syracuse. Their landing was 
virtually unopposed and the only 
casualties were the result of mines. 
Wellesley’s instructions were to wait 
until Syracuse was liberated and 
then assume control of the military 
administration of the town until his 
successor arrived. The critical lack 
of transport left no vehicles for civil 
affairs detachments and Wellesley 
was instructed to hitch-hike the 
ten miles into the city.25 Wellesley’s 
situation was typical for the civil 
affairs officer in Sicily who, once on 
the beach, was left “abandoned to 
fend for himself” with “no food, pay, 
mail, batman, or transport.”26 
Wellesley’s mission in Syracuse 
was temporary; his primary task was 
to oversee military administration 
of the city of Catania. Sitting at 
the eastern base of Mount Etna, 
Catania  had a  populat ion of 
approximately 250,000 inhabitants 
in 1943. Wellesley’s experience in 
Catania offers an example of what 
civil affairs in Sicily looked like 
and insight into the type of lessons 
learned. The Germans put up stiff 
resistance at Catania and for three 
weeks the city was subject to Allied 
bombardment from the air and the 
sea. On 5 August, parts of the city 
were liberated. Wellesley arrived to 
set up military administration and 
make his initial assessments. Three 
weeks of bombardment and heavy 
fighting in and around Catania 
caused unprecedented damage; 
telephone and tram wires were 
lying on top of the rubble of blown 
out houses; tram cars were stopped 
in streets blocked with rubble, and 
great amounts of waste paper littered 
the streets from blown out office 
buildings.27 
Wellesley’s first task was to 
contact what remained of the local 
administration to get a situation 
report. He met with the town mayor 
and the local prefect and determined 
that only 25 percent of the populace 
remained in the city. Food and 
electricity were non-existent and 
the water supply was cut by the 
Germans in their retreat. The other 
significant problem encountered in 
Catania was the massive number of 
unburied dead. Although a problem 
in many parts of Italy throughout 
the war, the situation in Catania was 
particularly acute because the town 
cemetery was located next to the port 
and the train station, the location of 
the heaviest Allied bombardment. 
Conditions were too dangerous to 
approach the area and the dead piled 
up during the weeks of bombing. To 
make matters worse, nearly half of 
the remaining population was living 
in air raid shelters and subjected to 
unsanitary conditions.28 The dead 
needed to be buried and the living 
properly fed and housed in order to 
avoid an outbreak of disease. The dire 
situation in Catania caused Wellesley 
to proclaim that the primary task of 
civil affairs in Italy was “to bury the 
dead and to feed the living.”29 The 
Top: Although language was a barrier, Allied soldiers found a way to communicate with local civilians. Here French Canadian troops 
speak with an Italian soldier (middle) in French. That Italian soldier was later recruited by civil affairs to serve on a local firefighting 
crew.  Above: To avoid financial chaos, civil affairs closed all banks as soon as they entered a city. With the cooperation of local 
civilians and the Carabinieri, the banks were re-opened when the situation in a particular city was deemed stable. By September 
1943, all banks on the island of Sicily were re-opened.
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phrase would become the mantra 
of civil affairs as the campaign 
progressed through Italy.
Feeding the living and burying 
the dead was a complicated task that 
required a great deal of organization 
and labour on the part of civil affairs 
detachments. Finding transport 
to remove dead bodies or to bring 
in grain to feed the living was a 
challenge for Wellesley and his fellow 
civil affairs officers. When civil affairs 
detachments were able to scrounge 
transport, it was quickly seized by 
the troops.30 In Catania, Wellesley 
was able to bring in grain enough 
grain from nearby Lentini using 
military trucks to meet immediate 
needs. But finding food was only 
half the battle. The mill in Catania 
was still under German fire and 
Wellesley could not risk sending 
military trucks loaded with grain. 
To solve the problem, Wellesley 
organized labour to remove the grain 
from the trucks, transfer it to carts 
and take it to the mill where it was 
ground, then transported back to the 
bakery where it was made into bread 
before it was distributed to the local 
population.31 The problem of feeding 
the population only worsened as the 
campaign continued. On 21 August, 
Wellesley needed 27 tons of wheat 
to feed the population. Three weeks 
later, the requirement was closer to 
100 tons.32 
Transportation issues plagued 
civil affairs officers throughout Sicily. 
In Licata, on the southwest coast, 
AMG officers were forced to use a 
hearse to transport grain to the local 
mill, only to find out that the mill 
was run by electricity, which was 
not functioning. The grain had to 
be loaded back onto the hearse and 
taken to a nearby town which had a 
steam-powered mill. When Messina 
was finally liberated in August, 
AMG transported grain by sea on 
tank landing craft (LCTs) and small 
Italian craft from Palermo.33 Back in 
Catania, Wellesley was able to meet 
immediate needs only because of the 
reduced population. As more locals 
returned to the city, he could not find 
sufficient grain to feed everyone. In 
addition to the immediate needs of 
food and the removal of the dead, 
civil affairs organized sapper teams 
to remove mines and repair water 
mains and signalmen to restore 
electricity. It took two to three weeks 
to restore water and electricity in 
Catania. While the engineer and 
signals units took care of restoring 
water and electricity, Wellesley 
recruited local labour to clear the 
streets of rubble to allow for military 
traffic.34 Wellesley was pleased with 
the efforts of the locals, commenting 
that the streets were cleared within 
24 hours.35 
Wellesley’s efforts in Catania 
meant that the army commanders 
could focus on their main task of 
waging war against the Germans. 
Catania was among the largest 
Sicilian cities and planners expected 
the cities, especially those subject 
to regular bombardment, would 
require more supplementary food 
and supplies in order to maintain 
a minimum standard.36 The smaller 
towns and rural villages were 
expected “to live off their own fat 
and off the surrounding country.”37 
This philosophy, in addition to the 
rapid movement of the campaign in 
some sectors, the minimal amount of 
resources, and the lack of integration 
of civil affairs with the troops meant 
that, in some cases, the fighting forces 
had to deal with problems that were 
normally the responsibility of civil 
affairs. Inland of the Pachino landing 
beaches, Canadian troops found an 
abundance of fruit trees and olive 
orchards but were immediately 
struck by the local squalor and 
“the hordes of natives (who) were 
returning from further inland by foot 
and donkey wagon which added very 
considerably to the already heavy 
road congestion.”38 Organizing and 
screening refugees kept civil affairs 
detachments busy throughout Sicily 
and Italy. The abundance of local 
agricultural products meant these 
refugees, for a time at least, would 
be able to feed themselves until 
The damage to Sicilian towns was 
extensive
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Many of the towns suffered 
damage to their infrastructure due 
to both the construction of Italian 
and German defensive works and 
Allied bombing. The repair fell to 
civil affairs. The lack of transport and 
organization meant that civil affairs 
officers were not always immediately 
available to assume control of a 
town. The job of civil affairs was to 
ensure “there is no interference with 
the military operations and with 
the fighting forces by the civilian 
populations because of disease, or 
want, or hunger.”41 In the absence of 
a civil affairs detachment, the fighting 
forces did not ignore the requirement 
to care for the most urgent needs 
of the civilian population. When C 
Company of the Seaforth Highlanders 
of Canada entered Pozzallo, on the 
southeast coast of Ispica on 11 July, 
they discovered that the inhabitants 
were starving. The Fascist mayor 
Left: Approximately 2,000 civilians took 
refuge in the catacombs in Syracuse in 
July and August 1943. 
Below left: Extensive war damage 
forced some Sicilians to find makeshift 
shelter. Here a family lives in a Roman 
amphitheatre. 
Below right: Many civilians fled the 
cities. Civil affairs had to organize the 
refugees as they returned home.
military governance was organized 
in the sparsely-populated area of 
southeastern Sicily. 
After debarking at Pachino, 
Canadian troops advanced into the 
Sicilian interior. The towns, such 
as Ispica, Modica, and Rosolini,39 
had been targeted by air and naval 
bombardment to soften German and 
Italian defences. By all accounts, 
Allied attempts were successful:
The town of SPACCAFORNO 
(ISPICA) is built on a rock cliff 
towering sheer to a height of 150 feet 
and heavily defended by extensive 
barbed wire fields. The groundworks 
on approaches to the town are 
good but artillery and tanks have 
completely ruined them. The town is 
old world, with a population of about 
2000 souls. It is built on the stepped-
up terraces well up on the crest of 
the rocky cliff. Towering above all is 
the town church in the early Italian 
Renaissance style of architecture. It 
is unfortunate that this town had to 
have a baptism of the effectiveness of 
the Allied Air Forces and deadliness 
of their efficiency is clearly seen 
[sic].40
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had fled at the first sign of invasion 
and abandoned the town.42 With the 
help of a priest and the postmaster, 
the Seaforths located the granary, 
broke into it and distributed its 
contents to the people to alleviate the 
situation.43 Such a feat in the middle 
of an advance took time and effort to 
organize by the Seaforths, whose time 
would be better spent in continuing 
the fight or resting and recovering 
for the next phase. In spite of this, 
their actions received the approval 
of the corps commander, Lieutenant-
General Sir Oliver Leese.44
The absence of a civil affairs 
detachment embedded with the 
advanced troops meant that there 
was a lack of security in occupied 
towns. In a few cases, the fighting 
troops encountered snipers and 
had to clear and re-clear the towns 
and villages before they could 
continue operations. After an artillery 
bombardment the Princess Patricia’s 
Canadian Light Infantry accepted the 
surrender of the occupying troops 
in the town of Modica in the early 
hours of 12 July. A few hours later, a 
corporal from the Seaforths entered 
the town and was surrounded by 
Italian soldiers and civilians who 
were desperate to surrender the 
town lest it be subjected to another 
bombardment. The corporal took 
a representative with him back to 
divisional headquarters. Later that 
same morning, small detachments 
from the Royal Canadian Regiment 
and from the Seaforths again 
entered the town, believing it to be 
cleared. They were ambushed in the 
main piazza. The FOO ordered an 
artillery bombardment, after which 
the Seaforths and RCR cleared the 
surrounding houses, taking more 
than 80 prisoners and capturing 
several enemy guns. The Edmonton 
regiment placed a platoon in the 
town to maintain security.45 After 
the town was cleared, C Company 
of the Seaforths “…had established 
a flour mill, opened up a bread line, 
elected a new town council, and 
had collected, with civilian help, 
a large dump of captured enemy 
equipment” all within hours. On 14 
July, arrangements were made for 
the company to rejoin the Seaforth 
Regiment.46 
In  Ragusa ,  the  Edmonton 
Regiment suffered seven casualties 
as a result of sniping when they 
entered the town on 15 July. Thirty 
Corps headquarters sent an officer to 
the town “with instructions to mark 
down 6 or 12 hostages who will be 
shot if this happens again.”47 A civil 
affairs detachment, if present, would 
have organized local administration 
and security upon entering the town, 
relieving the troops to go about their 
task of fighting the Germans and 
Italians. To his credit, Lieutenant-
General Leese recognized the error 
of not including civil affairs officers 
in early loading schedules.48 
Incidents in Ragusa, Modica, and 
Ispica, like those described above, 
led 1st Canadian Division to make 
arrangements for civil affairs. On 14 
July, orders came down to station a 
platoon of reinforcements in each of 
the three towns for garrison duties.49 
Between 16 July and 3 August, 
Lieutenant Syd Frost was the town 
major for Ispica. His experiences, 
about which he writes in his memoirs, 
reveal the suffering of local civilians, 
the delicate job of a civil affairs 
officer, and the welcome Canadian 
soldiers received in the towns of 
south-eastern Sicily.50 Frost, unlike 
Left: Italian and British soldiers work together restore electricity to the towns. 
Right: The cities suffered extensive damage from Allied bombings and German destruction.
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the American and British officers 
working in Sicily in July and August 
1943 to deliver aid and keep the peace 
in the rear was not trained in matters 
of civil affairs. Frost’s reflections 
show how lonely but rewarding the 
job of civil affairs was. He writes:
At the ripe old age of 21, I had taken 
over the administration of a town 
of more than 13,000 inhabitants, 
without any real authority from my 
superior officer or from anyone else. 
During the new two weeks I ran the 
town with hardly any outside help, 
not even from the headquarters of 
my own 4 Battalion, still 15 miles 
away in Pachino, near the beaches. 
But I thoroughly enjoyed every 
minute and concluded that perhaps 
a benevolent dictatorship was not, 
after all, a bad thing!51
His cheery outlook in some 
passages was balanced by his 
recognition of the dire situation that 
faced the Sicilian people:
Soon the people started to return 
from their caves in the cliffs. First to 
appear were the ones who had been 
wounded from our bombardment or 
from handling grenades by their own 
soldiers. One person had both hands 
blown off; another an arm; another 
a foot. We did what we could with 
our inadequate medical supplies. 
From early morning until late at 
night (even though I had imposed a 
curfew) a constant stream of Sicilians 
begged our help.52
On 26 July, Frost was visited 
by an American civil affairs officer 
assigned to take over duties in the 
town. A week later Frost rejoined 
the Patricias but only after a heartfelt 
goodbye to the townspeople. He and 
his platoon made a significant impact 
and it seems clear from his memoirs 
that the people of Ispica were sad 
to see him go. In Ispica, Frost had 
a unique experience as a Canadian 
soldier; he had the fortune of seeing 
the people, impacted by twenty years 
of Fascism and three years of war, 
restored:
In only a few weeks I had seen the 
people of Ispica shake off the terrible 
yoke of Fascism and make a fresh 
start on the road to democracy. They 
had worked hard to rebuild their 
town and their Sicilian way of life; 
they had found new confidence and 
hope for the future.53
The town of Ispica was only one 
Sicilian town impacted by the war. As 
the months progressed, more Italian 
towns and villages faced war. The 
job of civil affairs was not finished 
and the state of Italian towns only 
worsened as the war became more 
bitter after July and August 1943.
It took a little bit of good luck, 
but overall military government 
was a success in Sicily.54 Many 
important lessons were learned from 
the execution of civil affairs and 
implemented on the Italian mainland 
and later in other theatres of war. The 
first and foremost outcome of the 
Sicily campaign was the realization 
that it was necessary to convince 
lower formations of the need for 
civil affairs detachments. This led 
the Civil Affairs Staff Centre to begin 
a campaign that sold civil affairs 
and what it could do to the troops.55 
There was little time to promote the 
organization between January and 
July 1943 prior to the Sicily operation. 
With only six months to plan, there 
was not much time to integrate civil 
affairs officers with the assault force 
Left: Upon entering a town, the civil affairs officer in charge posted a series of proclamations 
in Italian and English outlining the terms of military government. Right: Carabinieri on duty in Sicily.
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units before D-Day or convince the 
troops of the need for civil affairs 
support. For follow-on operations in 
Italy, a permanent group of officers 
was attached to 5th and 8th Armies 
and they advanced with combat 
troops. These civil affairs officers 
worked to install military government 
immediately behind the front lines.56 
This eliminated problems of the type 
experienced in Modica where three 
different Canadian regiments had to 
clear and re-clear the town wasting 
valuable time and resources and 
suffering (and inflicting) unnecessary 
casualties as a result. The second 
lesson learned was that civil affairs 
needed more resources. No longer 
would the civil affairs officers be 
left abandoned with no support as 
Wellesley was south of Syracuse. The 
need was recognized for additional 
enlisted clerks, drivers, and transport 
for civil affairs detachments on the 
mainland.57 
The assessment of military 
government in Sicily in advance of 
the Allied landings on the mainland 
at Reggio Calabria, Taranto, and 
Salerno in September 1943 did not 
mean the end of military government/
civil affairs in Sicily. Much work 
was done after September 1943 
even as the Allies advanced further 
into southern Italy, extending the 
territory for which civil affairs was 
responsible and stretching resources 
and available personnel further. 
Although the success in Sicily was the 
result of good fortune and the positive 
reception and cooperation on the part 
of the Sicilian people, the experience 
prepared Allied civil affairs for 
the more desperate problems they 
would face on the mainland of Italy. 
In Naples, the Germans completely 
destroyed and booby trapped the 
town before leaving, having learned 
the lesson in Sicily that the Allies 
would expend significant time and 
resources providing humanitarian 
aid.58 In addition to continued 
work in Sicily and more severe 
circumstances on the mainland, the 
Italian armistice of September 1943 
changed Italy’s status from enemy 
to co-belligerent. As a result of 
the armistice, the Allies agreed to 
gradually restore liberated territory 
in the south, including Sicily, to the 
Italian government. In addition, civil 
affairs in Italy transformed from an 
organization of military government 
to an advising body in the Allied 
Control Commission, in all areas 
except those immediately behind the 
front lines.
D e s p i t e  m o r e  s e v e r e 
circumstances on the mainland, 
largely due to the stagnation of 
the fighting south of Rome and an 
evolving German scorched earth 
policy, efforts to put Sicily back 
together again after the 38-day land 
campaign continued well into 1944. 
Civil affairs officers worked to restore 
the Italian public health and education 
systems, and the civil administration 
infrastructure. Much of this work 
was facilitated by cooperation and 
assistance by the Sicilians themselves. 
For example, local doctors and nurses 
were instrumental in preventing the 
widespread outbreak of disease.59 The 
finance division reopened all Sicilian 
banks by 18 September despite issues 
with inflation and the black market. 
Many of the problems dealt with by 
civil affairs were symptomatic of 
the broken civil society caused by 
20 years of Fascism and the overall 
war rather than specifically by the 
Allied invasion. Inflation and the 
rising cost of living exacerbated the 
food and commodity supply issue 
and was accompanied by a rise in 
cases of venereal disease as Sicilian 
women became desperate to feed 
their families. Despite projections 
that Sicily was self-sufficient in 
wheat, the 1943 harvest was poor and 
by October, AMG was dealing with 
food riots in Palermo and Catania 
provinces.60 
Civil affairs was established 
as a military necessity to relieve 
combat troops from dealing with 
the needs of the population, but 
the organization, even with limited 
resources, went above and beyond in 
its efforts to restore Sicily, and later 
Italy, to its pre-Fascist state. Although 
suspicions that Sicilians were not 
particularly enamoured to Fascism 
were found to be true, AMG went 
to great lengths to ensure the Fascist 
problem was truly resolved. In the 
end, AMG arrested and interned 
only 1,500 Fascists and most were 
soon released. One of the major 
problems faced in expunging Fascism 
from Sicily was the degree to which 
welfare organizations “had become 
inextricably intertwined in the web 
of Fascist measures.”61 Many of these 
welfare organizations, including 
the Italian Red Cross, needed to be 
purged of their Fascist influences 
before they could effectively work 
with AMG to deliver aid in Sicily 
and Italy. The education system, at 
least on the surface, had also been 
influenced by Fascism and new, 
suitable textbooks were required 
before education programs were 
re-commenced. In addition, many 
of the schools had been damaged, 
some beyond repair, by Allied 
bombings. In November 1943, AMG 
was working to determine the state 
of schools and plan for their repair, 
find replacement textbooks, and 
screen available teachers but no 
determinations could be made for 
when schools might be reopened in 
Sicily.62 Military government ended in 
early 1944, when Sicily and a number 
of the southern Italian provinces 
were restored to the administration 
of the Italian government. While 
the battle for Sicily lasted a mere 38 
days, the battle to restore Italian civil 
administration and Sicilian society 
lasted seven months.
The stability mattered greatly 
to the Canadian Army. In late 1943, 
eastern Sicily became the staging and 
base area for the newly arriving 1st 
Canadian Corps troops.63
Allied Military Government in 
Sicily did not work perfectly. It is 
true that civil affairs officers recruited 
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some anti-fascist Mafiosi and placed 
them in positions of power. But 
AMG was not responsible for the 
restoration of the mafia in Sicily. What 
the critics of AMG do not mention 
is that Mussolini’s battle against 
the mafia was not as successful as 
the dictator claimed. In fact, the 
campaign against the mafia ended 
in 1929 with the declaration that the 
problem had been solved; the mafia 
was defeated. The Fascist-controlled 
press was ordered to follow the 
party line and avoid mentioning the 
mafia at all. Continued incidents 
of crime, violence, and lawlessness 
went unreported. Many of those 
gangsters jailed in the four year 
campaign were released and the 
mafia problem became worse in 
the 1930s.64 The main criticism of 
AMG in Sicily is unfounded in fact. 
Despite its flaws AMG was a useful 
attempt at a multi-national civil 
affairs model that would be used, 
and adapted, throughout the latter 
part of the Second World War. The 
reception accorded to the Allies by 
the Sicilian, and later Italian people, 
facilitated this model of civil affairs, 
enabling civil affairs officers to adapt 
and improve their ability to provide 
the needed support. To date, most 
historians have ignored the role 
of civil affairs in Sicily and Italy. 
Even this cursory glance65 at AMG 
in Sicily reveals a great deal about 
Allied policy toward the Italians,66 the 
weak hold Fascism had on Sicilians, 
the need to consider the civilian 
population when waging war, the 
utility of taking a benevolent attitude 
toward the civilian population, and 
the difficulties presented by the 
intricate nature and vast organization 
of Allied Military Government in a 
campaign already taxed for resources. 
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